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I. INTRODUCTION*
Athol Fugard, John Kani, and Winston Ntshona's 1972 play, Sizwe Bansi is Dead, opens with the main
character, Styles, sitting in his photographic studio in Port Elizabeth's New Brighton township,
reminiscing about working at Ford some years before. He recalls the time when the General Foreman,
"Baas" Bradley informed the workers about special duties for the day: they were to conduct an
unprecedented "General Cleaning" of the factory. For hours the men struggled to remove accumulated
dirt and oil from the machines and the factory floor. They were then handed brushes and were ordered
to paint lines on the floor indicating danger areas, a concern for safety not previously shown by the
company. Finally, they were ordered to take showers, and were provided with hitherto unknown luxuries
such as hot water, soap and real towels, and were then given new overalls, tools, aprons, and gloves.
Finally "Baas" Bradley gathered the workers together to explain their unusual work regimen,
using Styles as translator:
"Tell the boys in your language, that this is a very big day in their lives.'
'Gentlemen, this old fool says this is a hell of a big day in our lives.'
The men laughed.
They are very happy to hear that, sir.'
Tell the boys that Mr Henry Ford the Second, the owner of this place is going to visit
us. Tell them Mr Ford is the big Baas. He owns the plant and everything in it.'
'Gentlemen, old Bradley says this Ford is a big bastard. He owns everything in this
building, which means you as well'....
'Styles, tell the boys that when Mr Henry Ford comes into the plant I want them all to
look happy. We will slow down the speed of the line so that they can sing and smile
while they are working.'
'Gentlemen, he says that when the door opens and his grandmother walks in you must
see to it that you are wearing a mask of smiles. Hide your true feelings, brothers. You
must sing. The joyous songs of the days of old before we had fools nice this one next to
me to worry about.' [To Bradley] 'Yes sir!'"1
The great man's visit is an anti-climax: Ford peers in from the factory door, abruptly returns to his
waiting car and drives off. But if the visit was over, the working day was not: management immediately
ordered the line speed doubled, pushing the workers to make up production lost during the general
cleaning. Styles, angry at the games he must play to retain such a job, resentful of being "treated like a
monkey," decides to leave wage labor behind him, and opens up his own business.
The fictional Styles opts out of factory life, and takes his chances in the lower petite-bourgeoisie
of independent township entrepreneurs. The character is in part modelled on John Kani's actual
experiences as a worker at Ford; Kani, of course, quit Ford to become one of the most accomplished
actors in modem South African theater. But Styles' decision illustrates the limited choices available to
black workers as a whole in the auto plants in the late 1960s. Blacks in general, and Africans in
particular, received poor wages for performing the worst jobs, and faced virtually unbridled supervisorial
despotism. For coloureds, the promise of union protection was still some years away, while Africans
were to wait another decade for rights of union representation. It was only in the years after 1968 that
African activists at Volkswagen even dared speak privately about unions. Opting out was not an act of
opportunism, but of desperation; the only alternatives were either the false face of the smiling, minstrel-
like puppet Styles was forced to become, or waiting patiently until conditions changed and some kind of
union activity became possible again.
This paper is drawn from two chapters of my doctoral thesis, The Factory Belongs to All Who
Work In It: Race, Class, and Collective Action in the South African Motor Industry, 1967-1986,"
Columbia University, 1994.
In June 1980, barely a decade after the events portrayed in the first scene of Sizwe Bansi is
Dead, Volkswagen workers embarked on a strike which could only have appeared as an unattainable
fantasy to workers in the 1960s. In constructing their union, the workers provided themselves with the
possibility of another option beyond the narrow range offered to Styles and his brothers. To opting out,
selling out, or minstrelsy was added the choice of a chieving individual aims by joining a collective force in
pursuit of collective goals.
The 1980 Volkswagen strike was a watershed in the development of the autoworkers' union.
Moreover, the Volkswagen workers' mass action was all the more unusual because workers were
successful: they maintained discipline and were able to marshall their collective force with a negotiation
strategy which could yield positive results. But most unusual of all was that their solidarity crossed the
dividing lines defined by the government-imposed racial classification system: Africans joined with their
coloured co-workers in industrial action and mass protest. The 1980 strike demonstrated a rare cross-
race solidarity in contrast to unionizing efforts elsewhere in the country, including the one developing in
the automobile plants down the road in Port Elizalreth, where workers fractured on lines of race, leading
to years of bitter recriminations and internecine battles between unionists. Nowhere else in the motor
industry had the union achieved such clear unity across racial lines. Despite its importance, such cross-
race unity has been taken for granted in all accounts of the union and the labor movement itself. The
basis of this solidarity is the subject of this paper.
In doing so, it will - for reasons of space - deemphasize shop-floor and broader social and
political factors giving rise to militance which were, roughly speaking, similar for both coloured and
African workers. Instead, it will emphasize social processes which help to explain why such militance was
expressed in a non-racial manner uniting coloured;; and Africans. A number of important social
relationships, shaped in large part by the legacy of the uneven application of apartheid in Uitenhage,
bridged racially defined community divides, and brought coloured and African workers into close personal
contact at work and off-work. Through these relationships both ordinary workers as well as labor
activists came to identify each other as familiars rather than strangers, enabling them to devise a politics
of solidarity that defied the statutorially defined racial categorizations. Non-racial unionism did not arise
simply because workers shared similar grievances that enabled them to act collectively, but in large part
because particular social movement activists were able to help workers define their problems in a non-
racial way, and to provide non-racial class-collective solutions for these problems.
II. SOCIAL MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
One of the great difficulties in explaining collective action in South Africa - as elsewhere - is the
tendency to separate macro-level or structural explanations from more agency-based and voluntaristic
accounts of political and social events. In terms of theories of social movements, most explanations of
collective action fall within the sphere, respectively of theories of New Social Movements (NSM), and
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT).2
NSM stresses larger structural processes which give rise to social movements and which shape
the movements' ideological character In large part, NSM sees social movements as a product of the
transition from industrial capitalism and modernity to post-modernity and post-materialism. Not only do
these movements take up qualitatively new demands, but they do so in a qualitatively different manner.
Eschewing participation in established bureaucratic structures and institutions (usually, though not
exclusively including party systems), these movements prefer forms of mass mobilization, direct action,
and participatory models of democracy: a new form of politics supposedly characteristic of post-modern
societies.3
RMT, on the other hand, focuses more on the internal life of social movements. Writers in this
tradition spend less time analyzing the effects of social and political structures on movements; based on
the assumption that grievances exist in all societies, at all times, they prioritize the way organizations are
created to mobilize such potential.4 RMT thus examines the creation of social movement organizations
(SMOs), the activists/entrepreneurs who create and staff such organizations, and the resources they
create and use in pursuit of their goals.
Neither approach, however, does a satisfactory job of addressing the problem of structure and
agency. According to Klandermans and Tarrow, NSM "too easily assumes that mobilization potentials
form spontaneously through societal developments," ignoring the fact that social movements themselves
play a role in shaping peoples' ideas which impel them towards mobilization. On the other hand, RMT
focuses too narrowly on how social movements mobilize, but largely ignores how changes in social
structure create potentials for mobilization.5 Stated another way, NSM too often tends to view collective
action as a mysterious reflex "exploding," "emanating," or otherwise arising unexplained from structural
conditions, while RMT may tend to emphasize activists creating their politics little constrained by
external conditions.
Klandermans and Tarrow argue that an integration of the two approaches is necessary to
understand "how the potential for social movements which emerges from the social and political
structurc.is translated into social and political action." They hope to illuminate processes which
intervene between structural change and the activities of social movements.6 Klandermans has
developed the concept of "consensus mobilization" to account for social movements' efforts to help
potential members interpret the grievances arising from structural change. Consensus mobilization will
involve at the outset the movement helping people to identify the source of their grievance in systemic
rather than personal terms, and to accept that systemic solutions are required. Furthermore, movements
modify people's views of their grievances and, most importantly, what they can do about them;
movements must facilitate what McAdam refers to as "cognitive liberation," a crucial step in motivating
individuals to act.7
Perhaps the most important way in which consensus mobilization occurs is through what
McAdam has labelled the "micromobilization context," which he defines as "that small group setting in
which processes of collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to produce
mobilization for collective action."8 Recruits to social movement activism are seldom drawn out of the
blue, so to speak, but are instead already integrated into preexisting social networks conducive to
mobilization.9 Such networks provide "rudiments of organization" for a nascent movement, such as
leadership, communication infrastructure, and other means which are necessary conditions for action.
"As preexisting groups," McAdam argues, "these contexts provide the established roles and lines of
interaction necessary for action to unfold." More subtly, and more importantly, these micromobilization
contexts "supply the established structures of solidary incentives on which most social behavior
depends....the myriad interpersonal rewards that attend ongoing participation in any established group."10
Social movement activists may "appropriate" the established associational networks and emotional ties to
such organizations and transfer them to the new movement.
McAdam's insight is to show how such micromobilization contexts link macro conditions
favorable to mobilization to individuals' decisions to participate. Through the strong interpersonal ties
already existing in micromobilization contexts, social movement activists are in a better position to
produce "cognitive liberation." In such contexts potential recruits to the movement are not meeting
strangers, but activists whose credentials are previously established in the group. Not only is such trust
important, but reauits may also feel loyalty to the group and to leaders which facilitates their acceptance
of ideas, and this may provide a subtle pressure against deviation. Thus, while previously developed
attitudes favorable towards the movement may "push" a recruit towards activism, "a prior history of
activism and integration into supportive networks acts as the structural 'pull' encouraging the individual
to make good on his or her strongly held beliefs."11
The organizations and networks McAdam identifies do not have to be political in nature, nor do
recruits have to be members of organizations. Micromobilization contexts may be formal organizations,
formal or informal communication networks, and interpersonal networks. They may occur in all spheres
of life: religious, school, youth group, or sporting bodies, as well as in ethnic, gender, and community
groups. What is important is that through such prior engagement recruits will have already been
introduced as part of apparently "normal" (i.e. natural) and "acceptable" activity to movement-like
organizational practices and rudimentary forms of collective action. In this way the existing, relatively
non-controversial collective fabric of society provides the foundation on which activists build social
movements.
o The concept of micromobilization context helps to explain the way social movements translate
structural possibilities into concrete action. For present purposes, it provides a crucial conceptual bridge
which allows an explanation of the problem defined at the outset: how African and coloured auto
workers came to act together, defining themselves us a "we," as a collectivity with certain shared
meanings, identities, and interests, which could be Ixanslated into collective action.
III. FACTORY FLOOR ORGANIZATION IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
A. BLACK WORKERS' ENCOUNTERS WITH RACIAL DESPOTISM
When Elijah "Scoma" Antonie first entered the Volkswagen factory in February 1960, just one month
before the Sharpeville emergency, Africans made up a small percentage of the VW workforce, and were
confined to the most menial tasks in the factory. White supervision ruled the factory with an iron fist.
Scoma was appalled by the blatant favoritism and discrimination:
When I was introduced in that department it was said to me, "You see these whites who
are standing here, they are all your foremen. Even if a white man says you must go and
pick up shit, you must go and pick it up."
His first reaction was aggressive: "I will never pick up shit. I have come to work here. If a white man
a has done shit, it is for him to pick up that shit." Scoma was not alone. Though workers were quiescent
during the 1960s, they were certainly not content with their lot. Fury lay under the surface calm.
Vuyo Kwinana entered the factory only in 1972. But when he arrived, he was told by his
foreman that blacks cannot go to the toilet any time they pleased. "I have got to register my name
according to the alphabet. A goes first to the toilet, then B second, then C third in order." On his first
day Kwinana made a decision:
I felt on that particular day, "I am not fit to work here." Half-past four will be too far
for me to stretch, but I made it an option i:o stay in this department, clean out the
waste, and throw it out the window.
Both Scoma and Kwinana entered the factory with ideas which predisposed them to reject such
practices. When he joined Volkswagen, Kwinana bad been a member of the ANC underground since
1957, and had served a two-and-a-half year prison term in the 1960s for being a member of the banned
organization. Kwinana's father had been a leading - though conservative - figure in the ANC in East
London, before the family moved to Uitenhage in I951.12 Vuyisile Tole was one of the activists who
had recruited him into the underground; Tole had been a worker at Uitenhage's Fine Wool Products
[Veldspun] and had been dismissed during a locally celebrated 1955 strike.13 He had learned his trade
unionism - and was himself recruited into the ANC and MK - via Raymond Mhlaba of the ANC and
SACP and Themba Paulos of the ANC and TWIU
Scoma had not been a member of the ANC, but he had gained an understanding of trade unions
through lectures on the ANC and SACTU given by Zola Nqini, a local ANC and SACTU activist. He
had also heard stories about the exploits of TWIU unionists and their strike against Fine Wool Products
in December 1955." Both Scoma and Kwinana developed second thoughts about confronting the
Volkswagen foremen directly. Scoma was counselled by an older, more experienced worker:
There was an ex-teacher who used to work in that department, and he called me to one
side and said, "Hey, you've got to be very careful. You should go slow, because most of
the chaps here are very weak and they can sell you openly to these whites." And I was
wearing a school blazer then. Then as time goes on, I checked my way, how to make
these people aware that a trade union is very useful.
Scoma adopted a wise policy, given the era. From the beginning of the industry in the 1920s through to
the 1970s, foremen possessed vast discretionary powers, including the right to grant incremental wage
increases for workers, and most significantly, the power to hire and fire. It made little difference that for
most of its history white workers formed the bulk of the labor force in the motor industry: supervisorial
despotism was a hallmark of the industry irrespective of the racial composition of the workforce.
B. THE FORMATION OF NUMARWOSA AND THE UAW
The conditions Scoma described in the 1960s did not begin to change until after an Industrial Council
was established for the Eastern Cape motor industry in 1969. Oddly enough, the first breach in the wall
of management authority was made by the white Yster en Stal Unie, which managed to use access to the
National Party and the Minister of Labour and threats of imposing Job Reservation to win union
recognition in 1967 and the subsequent establishment of an Industrial Council. The existence of an IC
for the industry meant that the legal space existed to bring coloured workers into the same framework,
and in 1967 the Trade Union Council of South Africa [TUCSA] sponsored an effort to organize coloured
automobile workers in Port Elizabeth.15 Within months factory-level organizing committees had been
established at the three Port Elizabeth motor plants, Ford, General Motors, and Rover, and a new union
was launched: the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa
[NUMARWOSA].
Discriminatory practices on wage rates, promotions, and working conditions were foremost in
workers' minds. Each of the organizing committees set about building on these grievances to create a
wider base within their respective plants. At first they attempted to create a network of contacts in
different factory departments. Most contact people, while not resistant to the idea of a union, were
reluctant to meet, even secretly. They viewed a unionizing drive with considerable suspicion,
remembering the bannings, treason trials, and other repression meted out to activists. Among those who
were interested, few individuals were willing to take a leadership role. The factory organizers quickly
identified a strategy to overcome workers' reluctance; they identified and engaged senior long-service
workers who had some standing in the factory and hi the coloured community, such as ex-teachers and
rugby stars, and who were able - within the limits of the tune - to stand up to foremen. The factory
committee activists recruited such elder workers on an individual basis, and by bringing them into the
project, eased entry for other workers who identified with them.
As the organizing base grew, every department would have one or two volunteers helping the
organizing committee. These individuals would emphasize the workers' concrete grievances, especially
regarding foreman and pay, rather than broader political issues. Their efforts were in part facilitated by
the legality of then- initiative: though workers were certainly opening themselves up to victimization, then-
recruitment to NUMARWOSA did not contravene any existing laws. Finally, the activists would not
expose any names to management until they had enrolled a substantial majority of the workforce.
Starting in mid-1967 it took less than a year at Ford to sign up more than 50% of the coloured
workforce. The union began holding regular general meetings in the community for the new
membership. In ApriJ 1968, after ten months of organizing, the union elected an interim branch
committee to administer the union's affairs, a leadership that could come out publicly as advocates of the
union. After it became a formally registered union and gained entry to the IC in 1971, NUMARWOSA
leaders began planning a more ambitious strategy of national industrial unionism. As it was slowly
elaborated over the years 1971-1973, the strategy entailed an extension of its organizing efforts to Durban
and the Transvaal, mergers with other unions organizing automobile workers, and the commitment to
organizing on a non-racial basis.16
NUMARWOSA's Executive Council took its first policy decision to approach African workers in
late 1972.17 Its initial attempts were unsuccessful, partly because its organizing efforts were dissipated
across Port Elizabeth, East London and Uitenhage, and partly because, before the 1973 Durban strikes,
there was no national impetus supporting African worker organization.
Moreover, there were significant legal obstacles: as a registered union, NUMARWOSA could
not have African members. The union initially sent stop order forms to the companies they thought
would enroll African workers, hoping to create a fait accompli. Management rejected this approach, and
NUMARWOSA's leaders had to find ways to bypass the legal restrictions on African representation in
registered unions. In April 1973, the union adopted a familiar strategy through which coloured and white
unions had long dominated African workers: it established a parallel union, the United Automobile,
Rubber, and Allied Workers Union of South Africa [UAW].
The aim behind the new approach was to organize Africans until the UAW's strength was
comparable to NUMARWOSA's and then to merge the two organizations once the legal situation
allowed such a move. In contrast to the typical TUCSA parallel union, whose leaders were appointed by
the executive of the all-white union, the UAW would have leaders elected by the members, and a
separate executive which could take decisions on behalf of the membership. The two unions held joint
meetings, and formed a combined Advisory Council, on which sat representatives from the executives of
both organizations.18 The UAW was never seen by NUMARWOSA as a means of control over
Africans, nor as a permanent structure, but as nothiing more than a tactical device for organizing Africans
into one union of auto workers, once the legal climate permitted. Though UAW could not yet have
recognized shop stewards on the factory floor, its leaders functioned as de facto stewards, who would be
brought into NUMARWOSA's existing structures after the two unions united. The merger would finally
occur in October 1980: NUMARWOSA, UAW, and the WPMWU joined to form the National
Automobile and Allied Workers Union [NAAWU], the first truly national industrial union within the
emerging union movement.19
C FACTORY FLOOR ORGANIZATION AT VOLKSWAGEN
Volkswagen began hiring coloureds only in 1968, and NUMARWOSA immediately began
organizing them.20 In May 1969 more than 50% of the coloureds at Volkswagen were organized, and
NUMARWOSA was soon formally recognized by management. At that point, Volkswagen management
took the extremely rare step of introducing a Liaison Committee as a forum to address minor grievances
of African workers. Though Volkswagen workers would soon challenge it's structure, the Liaison
Committee at first operated as in other companies in South Africa: worker members and the secretary,
Elias Jonas, were appointed by management, rather than elected by the workers.21
By contrast to NUMARWOSA's rapid gains among coloured workers, the process of organizing
African workers was slow and painstaking, given their exclusion from the Labour Relations Act. Albert
Gomomo was a worker in the Printing Department, which was in the area adjacent to Scoma, who
worked in Dealer Aids. Gomomo had been a local activist in the PAC before it was banned, and had
worked at the Gubb and Inggs woolwashery in the 1950s before coming to Volkswagen. Gubb and Inggs
was near the Fine Wools plant, and Gomomo had l>een exposed to the TWIU activists who once
organized in that plant. He was thus knowledgeable about trade unions and had a clear political
perspective before coming to Volkswagen. Scoma did not know Gomomo, but Gomomo knew him, as
Scoma was a player on the Swallows rugby club, wliich Gomomo served as an official.
Gomomo approached Scoma, and their first discussions focused on rugby. Only later did they
focus on ANC and PAC politics. But Gomomo gradually encouraged Scoma to come forward and take a
more active role in building organization at Volkswagen. The workers' mounting complaints about the
Liaison Committee spurred them to discuss trade unionism.
Their first step was to talk with other workers in then* respective departments whom they knew
and trusted. Sometimes they would talk during lunch, or outside the factory after work in shebeens.
They targeted other elder workers who had some experience of the ANC and PAC in the 1950s, and who
had some experience in the trade union movement at that time. In their forays around the plant they
would often encounter such workers, as many Volkswagen employees had worked at Fine Wools as their
first job. Mongameli Davids and a Mr. Ndingane were among the first to enter the network. They were,
on their own initiative, working in a similar fashion in their own departments, finding three or four like-
minded workers to engage in regular discussions. They worked secretly, linking back to Gomomo, in a
cell system somewhat analogous to that developed in political struggle in the late 1950s.
In developing their organization, the network members discussed their general approach. They
wanted to build a union, but realized that such a task was impossible for African workers at that time.
They also developed their own critique of the failings of SACTU, in particular of its close links to the
ANC, which saw committee members of the one organization serving on the committee of the other. As
Scoma put it,
That is a mistake. If the ANC is banned, it stands to reason SACTU is also going to be
banned. Now in order to avoid that, we did not want to align ourself with the ANC
directly. We wanted to be an independent body.
Independence paid another dividend: the nascent organization was non-partisan, and attracted activists
from the camps of both exile organizations, as well as apolitical workers. Furthermore, the political
independence of the initiative helped reduce ordinary workers' fears of joining an organization whose
membership could be construed as "political." The early 1970s were so repressive that even a hint of
connection to the banned liberation movements could result in intervention by the security police; the
union's political strategy helped remove their efforts from the political field, and altered ordinary
workers' calculus of participation in favor of engagement.
After the Liaison Committee was introduced, and workers became disenchanted with what they
perceived as the stooge-like behavior of the management-appointed workers, the secret network came
upon the idea that they could take over the Liaison Committee as a first step towards developing a
union. Gomomo secretly introduced Scoma to contacts in other areas of the factory, canvassing them
about putting him onto the Committee to ensure that such a step would not be seen as selling out to
management. Gomomo recruited his younger brother, John Gomomo, as another candidate for the
Committee.22 Both Scoma and John Gomomo had excellent work records, so neither could be easily
victimized, and they were not members of the banned political organizations. They could come forward
as acceptable public fronts for the growing network.23
Scoma and Gomomo approached management to complain about the behavior of the
management appointees to the Liaison Committee, and won the right to elect African workers to the
structure. In 1971 both became members of the Committee, and once elected, they were able to win the
appointment of a new secretary, Elcott Rhoxa, a staunch member of their circle. From the Liaison
Committee they began to take up workers' grievances, operating as quasi-shop stewards. Much of their
time was occupied fighting unfair dismissals and job upgrading cases, but they also pushed the company
to finance community creches, a scholarship scheme for workers' children, and a sports stadium for
Kwanobuhle township.
Targeting the Liaison Committee was strategically wise. Volkswagen had itself established the
committee, and it was less threatening to management to mobilize workers around its inadequacies than
it was to organize a union. Ordinary workers would feel more comfortable enlisting in the project, as
their fear of victimization by management was reduced. In this way, the activists' strategy helped reduce
an important obstacle for ordinary workers to join the organization.
The takeover of the Liaison Committee did not occur in a vacuum. From Scoma's first days on
the Committee he had begun discussions with Chris "Papa" Williams, then NUMARWOSA President,
and one of the strongest advocates in the union for the new policy of organizing Africans. Williams had
been involved in non-racial rugby as a coach and manager, and, fortuitously, frequently found himself
working in Albert Gomomo's department at Volkswagen. Through Gomomo the NUMARWOSA
President was in close contact with the growing informal network among African workers. Scoma also
had a number of close friends among coloured workers, against whom he played in local friendly rugby
matches, and whom he knew from rugby administration. Through them he met the other
8NUMARWOSA shop stewards and began to cement friendships. The NUMARWOSA shop stewards
and the insurgent Liaison Committee members began to meet regularly prior to Committee meetings, to
discuss the agenda, and to ensure that the subject matter of the Liaison Committee did not undermine
what the union was simultaneously negotiating with management. In this way the coloured union
ensured they would not be undercut by African workers, and also that workers would present a united
front to management. Their joint work developed to the point where the NUMARWOSA shop steward
and the Liaison Committee members met routinely to discuss all matters brought up before
management.
These informal joint meetings were in place by 1973 when NUMARWOSA decided to form the
UAW. Indeed, as Williams was one of the stronger advocates of the NUMARWOSA policy, it is highly
likely that his experience with Gomomo and the other African workers at Volkswagen influenced his
(thinking on the broader union policy, as he had very direct and practical experience that such bonds
could in fact be built.
With the creation of the UAW - at least on paper - the NUMARWOSA activists began wooing
African workers. At Volkswagen the policy proceeded slowly, as the shop stewards invited the Liaison
Committee insurgents to the NUMARWOSA offices in Port Elizabeth, and to the coloured union's
offices in Uitenhage to discuss their joint problems. Slowly the idea developed that the Liaison
Committee could serve as a base from which to organize African workers into the UAW, and seek some
form of recognition from management.
The social networks, which were the foundation on which the union grew, were not limited to
those between coloured activists in NUMARWOSA and Africans on the Liaison Committee. As the
network Gomomo constructed was non-partisan, it intersected the ANC's clandestine cell system.
Working underground, Congress members in Volkswagen strove to build the UAW by encouraging those
within their influence to join.24
As Vuyo Kwinana reflected,
We knew NUMARWOSA was very powerful as a trade union. We had no doubts
about it, but our main purpose was to bring the black workforce over to
NUMARWOSA's side....We fully influenced our people to join UAW and join
NUMARWOSA.
Kwinana had no problems building a union which was politically "independent" from his own
organization, nor was he under instructions to penetrate Volkswagen. But after experiencing
discrimination in the company, he decided to help organize the workforce:
I had to contact my organization afterwards, and told them about the plight of the
workers. Then they said, "Do influence the workers as much as possible. We will try
and assist you if we can." So my work was to destroy the Liaison Committee and
establish a trade union at VW. That was my prime duties as an ANC worker, as an
ANC member.
Through workers like Kwinana the cells influenced the Liaison Committee members to "motivate them
what direction to take, what strategy to apply."
A cell member would secretly approach workers in his department whom he trusted and, after
talking with them at length, would encourage them to move into other areas of the factory, from where
they would remain in touch with him on a regular basis. Kwinana described the typical manner in which
the cells - without announcing their identity - would influence workers:
Scoma is in my department. He reports to me practically every day what their plans are
in the Liaison Committee. We in turn, investigate from NUMARWOSA, because a
friend of mine is...a coloured shop steward at Body Shop. He draws information from
this coloured chap, and bring them to us. And we sit down to analyze the information
brought by this coloured and to the Liaison Committee we said, "This is wrong. These
people must not move this way, they must move this direction." And then we start to
influence now and encourage the Liaison Committee to move in this line.
These individuals almost never became shop stewards or office-bearers of the union, but instead kept a
low profile as ordinary workers on the floor, from where they could quietly exert their influence by
discussing issues with other workers.
Themba Dyassi was a central figure in the clandestine system. He was a member of Kwinana's
cell, and a welder in the Body Shop. He first became involved in politics at school in the late 1940s, and
after being expelled found work in Uitenhage with a building contractor, but lost his job in the
victimization which followed the November 1952 Port Elizabeth stay-at-home.25 After finding work at
Goodyear in Uitenhage, he entered the ANC cell structures, from where he was eventually recruited into
MK He was arrested in April 1964 while preparing to leave the country for military training. Sentenced
to 2 1/2 years for membership in the ANC, he served most of his time on Robben Island, where he
decided that upon his release he would return to factory work and attempt to build trade unions. In
1967 he got a job at GKV in Uitenhage, and after a brief spell back at Goodyear took a job at
Volkswagen in late 1974. Dyassi deliberately avoided taking a leadership role in the union, and especially
avoided becoming a shop steward. He preferred to remain on the line:
Being a shop steward is a very difficult job because most of the time you are at the
offices. But being a worker, we are amongst workers. You can actually see what is
happening. Being a shop steward you are told what was happening there at the work
place.
From his position on the floor Dyassi could directly influence workers in his area, bring them into the
union, and mediate between ordinary workers and the stewards. He recruited promising individuals into
the union and into the ANC underground structure, and provided valuable political education and
discipline, especially to younger members. He was part of the bedrock structure of both the union and
the ANC: both organizations' direct link to ordinary workers whom the movements wanted to mobilize.
The ANC cell network operated inside the factory, during lunch times and breaks, and outside
the factory in the townships.
We met informally outside the factory in the cell structure....we would ask a chap from
VW, especially the coloureds, to come and drink with us over the Saturday, then we
start questioning him, "What do you think about this and that?" We found that, more or
less, they are very positive, they want to work closer, and sympathized greatly with the
African. So we saw very fertile ground for us to influence them.
The coloured worker would not have been aware that he was meeting with the underground; as far as he
understood, he was meeting ordinary Volkswagen workers in a social gathering at which they "talked
shop." Through these networks the cell members gained a broad purchase on developments inside
Volkswagen, and given the members' commitments to building the union, solidified its presence in the
factory.
In Volkswagen NUMARWOSA developed something it lacked in virtually all its other
workplaces: extremely close links between its leaders and prominent African workers who had legitimacy
in the eyes of the African workforce. These connections made it far easier to present the idea of
developing the UAW, which was, after all, a parallel union that could easily be construed as part of an
oppressive strategy by coloured workers to dominate Africans. To have workers like Albert Gomomo
and Vuyo Kwinana as advocates of the UAW helped clear away any misgivings about the organization's
bona fides.
For reasons which remain unclear, the organizing drive only got started in 1975, perhaps because
10
of NUMARWOSA's preoccupation with withdrawing from TUCSA. But the Liaison insurgents affiliated
to the UAW launched another drive between 1976 and early 1977. Volkswagen management was well
aware that the Liaison insurgents were organizing a union, but they had no idea how successful the drive
had been. They were soon to find out. In mid-1977 an unlikely pair of visitors appeared at the plant one
day to meet the Managing Director, Peter Searle and Ollie Rademeyer, the Industrial Relations Director.
The delegation consisted of Werner Thonnessen, Assistant General Secretary of the International
Metalworkers Federation, visiting South Africa for meetings of the South African Coordinating Council
of the IMF, and Johnny Mke, President of the UAW. It was no mere courtesy call: Thonnessen and
Mke brought with them stop order forms signed by more than 60% of Volkswagen's African employees.
Management quickly decided that UAW was supported by the African workers, and recognized it. Thus,
well before the Wiehahn labor law reforms were announced, Volkswagen recognized the UAW, gave
them stop-order facilities, and scrapped the Liaison Committee. To comply with existing law the
members' stop orders were technically defined as contributions to a burial fund.
The four insurgent members of the Liaison committee immediately stood for election as UAW
shop stewards, entering the structure established by the coloured union in the early 1970s. Scoma and
John Gomomo were elected to the corps of 4 UAW and 4 NUMARWOSA stewards,26 and were taken
on shop steward training courses conducted by NUMARWOSA.27 The two unions shared offices, held
joint meetings, and made decisions together in a Branch Executive Committee which included elected
representatives from both. UAW observers sat with NUMARWOSA in the Industrial Council, and
together they plotted their strategy there. By the following year they were discussing strategies for
merging the two unions. Thus, on the shop floor, I he Liaison Committee insurgents - now recast in the
role of UAW shop stewards - and the NUMARWOSA activists were realizing the strategy developed
within NUMARWOSA in 1972-73 to build one non-racial industrial union of automobile workers.
What made the Volkswagen experience unusual is that at no other plant in the entire country
did NUMARWOSA-UAW succeed in unifying coloureds and Africans into a single unit. At Ford a
racial division of labor meant that coloureds were congregated at its Neave plant, while its Struandale
Engine and Cortina Plants had almost entirely African workforces. UAW organized workers at Engine
Plant, but they never successfully united with NUMARWOSA at Neave, the way the two unions had
done at Volkswagen. Nor did UAW succeed at the much larger Cortina assembly plant. Instead, after a
series of wildcat strikes in late 1979 and early 1980 this plant was to be organized by a breakaway African
grouping which would soon form the Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union [MACWUSA].
At General Motors, too, the NUMARWOSA branch was long hostile to organizing Africans, and UAW
never took off. After 1980 the overwhelming majority of African workers at GM would also be
organized by MACWUSA.
IV: FRIENDSHIP AND FAMILIARITYi SOCIAL NETWORKS OF SOLIDARITY
An analysis of the workplace and labor process would certainly be important in accounting for why it was
that unions formed as collective responses to shared conditions.28 Workers' cross-race solidarity,
however, cannot be explained simply by reference l:o their insertion into a labor process which
engendered a sense of cooperation amongst workers and grievances against management. Indeed, very
similar working conditions were present in the plants when whites were the bulk of semi-skilled
operatives, and did not encourage the development: of solidarity among them. It certainly did not foster
solidarity between white and black workers when the latter came into the factories in the 1960s. Indeed,
similar conditions of work were present in the Porl: Elizabeth auto plants, and workers there did not
develop a collective body Unking coloureds and Africans. An explanation of cross-race solidarity must
therefore take into account social relations outside the factory.
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A. APARTHEID'S CHICKENS COMING HOME TO ROOST: THE CONSEQUENCES OF KABAH'S
FAILED REMOVAL
1. The Uneven Application of Racial Separation
Since the 1840s, Uitenhage's African population has resided in the Kabah Location. Kabah's population
was always racially diverse: between the 1930s and 1950s coloureds made up approximately 25% of those
living in the "African" location. From the 1950s, however, many coloureds left Kabah as new
Municipally-built sub-economic and economic letting schemes were started in Gerald Smith and Thomas
Gamble townships, and a freehold private housing development opened known as Jubilee Park.
Nonetheless, many coloureds remained behind in Kabah even into the 1970s, and these coloured housing
schemes were in fact built in extremely close proximity to the Location. Social contact between Africans
and coloureds was the norm rather than the exception, and indeed, before the passage of the Population
Registration Act in 1950 and the application of the Pass Laws for Africans, the line separating coloureds
from Africans was rather fluid, more notional than statutory.
One of the main aims of apartheid legislation after 1948 was not simply the spatial segregation
of residential areas, but the thorough separation of social, political, and economic activities. Group
Areas, for example, were drawn in such a manner that a member of a certain group would not need to
traverse another race's Group Area on the way to work or to shop. Virtually any form of contact was
made extremely difficult. Other pieces of legislation enshrined this racist principle: new laws banned
cross-racial sex or marriage, separate educational systems kept school children apart, while the Labour
Relations Act of 1956 included clauses prohibiting different races from joining the same trade union.
Of course if the "blueprint's" aim was to achieve full segregation, it proved extremely difficult in
practice to sort out the diverse, racially heterogeneous areas of certain cities, especially in the Cape
Province where Africans, coloureds, and Indians all had long traditions of property ownership in areas
zoned for white occupation under the Group Areas Act. The extent of heterogeneity differed from place
to place, while the struggle to impose apartheid legislation proceeded at an uneven pace and was often
resisted by local authorities.29
In Uitenhage, the central state's desire forcibly to remove Kabah consistently came undone,
through a combination of resistance by the local Council, shortage of funds at the national level, and
general bureaucratic inefficiency. Removals from Kabah to the new African township at Kwanobuhle
began only in 1968, and even then, at such a slow pace that Kabah's African population remained
relatively intact through the 1970s. With a huge urban influx due to the disastrous drought of the early
1980s, Kabah's population in 1985 was as large as ever. Its persistence was a continued affront to
apartheid planners' dreams for a racially ordered community.30 In Port Elizabeth, on the other hand,
the extensive historical practices of local segregation, coupled with the removal of Africans from Korsten
after 1955 meant that Africans and coloureds were almost entirely separated from one another by 1957-
58.31
2. Contact Across the Divide
In contrast to the racially-engineered geography of Port Elizabeth, Kabah's delayed removal created
structural possibilities well into the 1980s for contact between Africans and coloureds, who were either
living in the same neighborhood or in close proximity. Most of these contacts grow out of the long
history of contact in the community before it began to be chopped apart on the Procrustean bed of
apartheid planning.
Workers who grew up in Kabah have rich memories of contact with people from other races.
Most coloureds lived in the south-eastern section of Kabah, the Baines Road and Middle Street area.
One African worker remembered the area clearly:
Middle Street, the street that was actually the dividing street between the coloureds and
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the Africans....So we used to grow up and play in the same street with the
coloureds...that's where we got our Afrikaans. I didn't get my Afrikaans in school....We
sort of got friendly with the coloureds. We regarded ourselves as one people.
The same worker recalls going to church services at the mostly coloured Apostolic Faith church and at
the Dale Street Congregational Church, the latter under the leadership of Rev. C.W. Hendrickse and
later, his son, Rev. Alan Hendrickse.
Other workers recall joining with coloured children to look after livestock on the north-eastern
edge of Kabah. The bush provided respite for children in many ways, as one coloured worker recalled:
Sometimes on hot days, there was a big dam...there at the other side of the hill, the
other side of the bosch. We'd go there, learning each other how to fish....Well, we had
no fishing rods. If you see a fish you have got a big stick, you just hit that fish with that
stick. Sometimes you are fortunate, sometimes you are not fortunate.
A coloured worker, who grew up with Africans in Blikkiesdorp, across Maduna Road from the main area
of Kabah, recalled what he and his friends did for entertainment:
It was near to the bush, we as guys got a big place alone, where we always played rugby,
go and play in the bush, cowboys and crooks. It was a lot of fun to live there.
The statutorily-imposed definitions of race and residential segregation upset what were in fact
sometimes extremely close and comfortable relations between different "races." But the official
categories did not mesh with people's direct experience in more ways than one. Color, alone, was hardly
a clear demarcation of official racial identity, as one worker explained:
You sometimes cannot easily identify a coloured from a black man. You can only
identify him by listening to his speech, and you say, "Hey, this is a coloured man. I
didn't know he was a coloured." Most people think that I'm a coloured...because of the
color of my skin. It's what happens in most cases.
For the people themselves, social practices, such as language or adherence to African customary practices
like circumcision and lobola were more crucial to determining group inclusion than were biological
considerations, such as skin color or facial features. Social practices are of course far more malleable
than biological characteristics, and people can adopt or reject certain practices for a variety of reasons.
Adoption came about through intermarriage in at least two cases among those interviewed. The
mother of the worker who above described the Middle Street area, was the daughter of a Sotho woman
and a coloured man, and was officially classified as coloured; the workers' father was a Xhosa. As a
child the worker learned to speak Xhosa, Afrikaans, and seSotho. But his mother's brothers and sisters
have coloured spouses, live in Uitenhage's coloured areas, and are legally considered to be coloured
people. While his brothers and sisters are legally African, his cousins are legally coloured. This didn't
present a problem for the worker concerned:
I see them as my brothers and sisters. We are in fact one in the same people who see
no difference at all. As far as they are concerned, I usually go there and sleep overnight
and their friends in turn take us as their brothers and sisters. And also when they do
come over to this end our brothers and sisters and our friends take them as the same.
Nor did the worker experience strife with his cousins over participation in his customs:
When we do make our customs, some of them attend, because when there is meat, we
braai [barbecue] the meat, cook the meat, they take it, they have no objections at all.
And I've seen lately that the coloureds aliio have adopted some of our customs, because
some of the coloureds are actually African people. If your mother is coloured and your
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father is black, and you choose to be coloured, you go and live in a coloured area and
you grow up as a coloured, but since your father was an African, you still have to abide
by your father's customs. And unfortunately for you, you are staying in a coloured area
where these customs are not being practiced. But, I've seen changes lately that most of
the coloureds [who have African fathers] are being circumcised.
These cases raise complicated questions about the processes through which people develop racial
identities, a subject beyond the theoretical scope of this work. However, at a more prosaic level the
social practices described above led to important interactions across legally-constituted communities,
which reveal a great deal about workers' actual lived experience of race.
In the case of this particular worker, he regularly (though not frequently) had occasion to visit
relatives in the coloured areas and for them to visit him in Kwanobuhle. Nor were the visits fleeting
encounters for trivial reasons, but were in fact sustained over weekends, and were organized around
important, meaningful family rituals. For many other workers, visits across the apartheid divides were
extremely common, and covered a range of activities from spur-of-the-moment socializing, to political
and union gatherings, to sports.
Almost two-thirds of the Volkswagen workers interviewed visited across the community/race
divide on a regular basis. Well more than half the African workers visited into coloured communities,
while almost all the coloured workers visited into African communities. On average, African workers
paid more than 3 visits a month to coloured communities, while coloured workers paid just under 10
visits a month to African communities. Over hah0 the workers interviewed visited across the racial divide
at least once a month. A small number visited less frequently, while fewer than 4 in 10 never paid such
visits.
By contrast, at General Motors African and coloured workers socialize across the racial divide
rather less frequently than Volkswagen workers. African workers visited coloured areas an average of
1.5 times per month, while coloured workers visited African areas on average 3 times per month. One
quarter of the coloureds and a third of the African workers interviewed at GM paid one or more visits
across the racial divide. However, well more than two-thirds of all workers paid less than one visit per
month, or never visited at all.32
The figures for coloured workers at GM roughly parallel the findings from Marianne Rome's
1973 survey of coloured automobile workers in Port Elizabeth. She found that only 22% of the coloured
workers interviewed paid one or more visits to African work friends in the month prior to being
surveyed. These figures are not due to a general lack of sociability among coloured workers in Port
Elizabeth: 84% of the workers surveyed had paid one or more visits to other coloured work friends
during the same period.33 The image which emerges is of very frequent contact between Africans and
coloureds in Uitenhage, though rather greater frequency of contact by coloureds to African areas than
the reverse, but of very little similar cross-race contact between Port Elizabeth Africans and coloureds.
In contrast to the apartheid ideal of total separation, the statutory divisions between Africans
and coloureds broke down in practice as a result of social interaction in a variety of spheres: people
joined together in pubs, weekend parties, sport, churches, even in inter-marriage. In this wide range of
activities African and coloured workers daily created social bonds of friendship and affection, contacts in
which they learned first-hand of each other's lives, and came to share experiences and understandings.
In large measure these exchanges formed the social basis of solidarity which supports a wide range of
oppositional and cross-race social movement activity. Of course the imposition of a more thorough-going
apartheid in Port Elizabeth did not prevent the emergence of strong social movements there, but it did
profoundly shape the character of those movements, rendering it far more difficult for joint involvement
of Africans and coloureds in the same project.
Of all the areas of social interaction, one in particular proved most important as the meeting
ground between African and coloured auto workers. For both African and coloured men sport was one
of the most important areas of commumty activity, and no sport had a greater purchase on their loyalty
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than does rugby football. It was the dominant group sport among young African and coloured workers
growing up in the Eastern Cape from the 1940s to the 1960s, and the way it was played in the two towns
captures the differences in social interaction between Africans and coloureds in Uitenhage and Port
Elizabeth.
B. KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE BALL: RUGBY, INTERACTION, AND SOLIDARITY
1. The Game of Choice
Rugby football is commonly associated with South Africa's white population, especially Afrikaners, where
it assumes the dimensions of a civil religion.34 In most of South Africa rugby is a white game, while
blacks largely follow and participate in other sports such as cricket, road running, boxing, and of most
importance, soccer. In the Eastern Cape, however, rugby has long been the game of choice for both
African and coloured people, and is followed with religious fervor.35 It is occasionally played between
white and black teams, but more commonly, it is a game played by and between coloureds and Africans.
Rugby is thus an important arena in which the two groups are brought together socially on a routine
basis.
Rugby was imported to the Eastern Cape by British missionaries, and formed an important part
of the curriculum at mission schools. In the missionaries' perspective, proper training in cricket and
rugby were considered crucial to weaning Africans from tribal pursuits and fostering an educated,
assimilated elite on an English model.36 The first sides were based at these educational institutions.
The first adult club was formed in Port Elizabeth in 1887, and the game quickly spread to towns
throughout the region.37
According to Peires, since the 19th century the game has been closely associated with the central
concerns of black communities, serving not only as entertainment, but "as a vehicle of popular culture
and as an outlet for personal achievement and ambition" which always attracted the leading civic and
intellectual figures. In communities with few avenues for personal or political expression, "energies which
might otherwise have been devoted to local or national service were displaced into rugby." Indeed, in the
last twenty years, Peires convincingly argues, rugby was transformed from a substitute for politics to "an
arena of national struggle, attacking a particularly vulnerable heel of the apartheid state."
Such a transformation was aided by the National Party's own politidzation of sport and its
application of rigid apartheid to such pursuits. Sport per se could not be banned, though incredible
obstacles could be thrown in the way of sports administrators and players.38 Administrative pressures
could be placed on undesirable sides or breakaway unions, by denying clubs access to facilities. In fact, it
was the state's refusal in 1973 to recognize the Kwazakhele Rugby Union [KWARU], which had broken
away from the official and racially-exclusive South African African Rugby Board [SAARB], which pushed
KWARU into the arms of the South African Rugby Union [SARU], an affiliate of the anti-apartheid
South African Council on Sport [SACOS]. KWARU was excluded from the well-serviced stadium in
Kwazakhele, and state radio refused to broadcast the Union's matches. The heavy-handed action by the
state rallied popular sentiment to KWARU, and virtually all of the better players and teams in Port
Elizabeth moved over to the new non-racial union. KWARU became a nesting ground for non-racial
political activists, including both Black Consciousness and ANC-aligned figures, who endorsed the goals
of non-racial sport and opposition to state policy.
The government's encouragement of the game, if only on a racially divided basis, created space
for people to operate and (within limits) to pursue their own agendas. Rugby matches were among the
only places where blacks could legally gather into large crowds, and the events could be quickly
transformed into political events at half-time or during a break in play: an impromptu speech might be
made, a freedom song sung, a hat passed around for a political cause, or a moment of silence observed.
At a less overt level, the political symbolism would not be lost on the audience if, at the occasional match
between black and white sides, the black team demolished its opponent.39
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2. Non-Racial Rugby and Social Interaction in Uitenhage
At an organized level, Uitenhage teams had long played together in "friendly" matches pitting sides from
Kabah or Kwanobuhle against sides from the coloured areas or from the district. Such contact grew
much more frequent when both coloured and African sides broke away in the 1970s from their respective
racially-exclusive official bodies to join the SARU-affiliated Uitenhage and District Rugby Union where
they would play fixtures together on a regular basis, and would compete for local cups and the Union
and SARU championships. By contrast, after KWARU broke away from the SAARB, it formed a
separate union within SACOS, while coloured sides in Port Elizabeth continued to play under SARU's
Eastern Province Rugby Union. Thus sides from Port Elizabeth's African and coloured townships would
not play together within the same league, but only on the occasional friendly basis, or at the level of
inter-provincial play for the SARU championship.
Rugby brought African and coloured people in Uitenhage into extremely close contact. With the
rising power of the SACOS-affiliated SARU in Uitenhage, teams began to integrate: in small numbers
Africans joined once all-coloured teams, like Excelsiors, and some coloureds joined African sides, such as
Swallows. These "cross-overs" were welcomed into the full range of club activity, which brought them
into regular contact with teammates from across the race divide. One coloured worker who joined
Swallows journeyed regularly to Kwanobuhle for practice and for matches. As a result, he established
close friendships with his teammates, and would visit frequently:
[Before the emergency] That was every weekend. I stay overnight sometimes in
'Nobuhle and in Langa location. Oh, I have got a lot of friends there. I've got a lot of
African friends.
This particular form of integration was relatively unusual, as most teams remained strongly based in
neighborhoods, and with the consolidation of Group Areas from the late 1960s, the racial separation of
communities largely defined the character of the teams.
Notwithstanding the internal composition of the sides, during the season clubs affiliated to the
Uitenhage and District Rugby Union would play each other every weekend, which meant that for some
period of time coloureds would visit African townships and Africans would visit coloured areas. Teams
would at least travel through different communities and players would be exposed to conditions faced by
others. As one African worker put it:
We happen to be staying together. Even in my team, we've got some coloured chaps,
and even in my [rugby] Union we've got a coloured team from Rosedale and Gamble.
So on weekends, sometimes you play there during the weekends, or they come here, or
we play at Langa. Always together.
The keen dedication and single-mindedness sportsmen show on the field extended to their
entertainments after the match: the game would often be but a prelude to a full evening or even
weekend of socializing:
 t
Sometimes we play at their places. Some of the chaps they slept there. [Then] they
take their coloured chaps, their friends which they have there, to Kwamobuhle.
The parties are often raucous affairs of singing and dancing, well supplied with barbecued meat and
alcohol, but with a strong camaraderie among teammates, as well as between members of opposing sides.
In this way people from different officially-designated races spent considerable time together in the
intimate, personal space of a family home.
3. A Tale of Two Unions: NAAWU and the Uitenhage and District Rugby Union
Relationships established through rugby for purely social purposes played an important role in cementing
16
ties between workers which were drawn upon in the union's struggle for recognition and consolidation.
Rugby was not simply a venue for social interaction between coloureds and Africans, but a site of contact
between coloured and African workers. Workers in Uitenhage were keen sportsmen, both as participants
and spectators. Half of those interviewed were themselves either active sportsmen or former athletes
who had become administrators of sports dubs or leagues. Many more were simply spectators or dub
supporters. Though some of the shop stewards were retired athletes, none were simultaneously involved
in sport and union activities, as sport consumed too much time.
Some of the key activists in the formation of the union forged their initial acquaintances and
friendships on the rugby field. These relationships could be drawn upon in the workplace by the union
struggling for recognition. Elijah Antonie, for example, was a player on Swallows football dub when
Albert Gomomo was an administrator, where Gomomo could take the measure of the man.
Finally, sport provided a forum for comscicntization, for the development and transmission of
ideas which could serve simultaneously to promote athletic and workplace unity between coloured and
Africans. SARU had been launched in 1962, but made no inroads among African rugby players in the
Eastern Cape until the early 1970s. KWARU's break with the SAARB was driven by administrative
conflicts rather than principle, and initially it sought refuge as a separate union under SAARB, rather
than taking up sides with SARU. It was only in 1973, after the SAARB - backed up by the state -
rejected KWARU's application that the new union joined the ranks of non-racial rugby. The same
situation obtained in Uitenhage, where the apartheid rugby bodies remained strong into the early 1970s.
It was only after KWARU's break from the racial structures that Uitenhage sportsmen began discussing
the possibilities of non-racial sport.
KWARU's existence provided an exit option for Uitenhage dubs dissatisfied - for whatever
reason - with the Uitenhage African Rugby Board (affiliated to the SAARB). After the 1974 season the
first split in the Uitenhage body occurred when one African team, Star of Hope, jumped to KWARU.
The breakaway encouraged others to do the same, but sports activists on the Swallows Rugby Football
Club had a more sophisticated strategy in mind.
Swallows was a powerful dub in the Uitenhage African Rugby Board, fielding impressive teams
in all three divisions, and it was one of the biggest dubs in the Board. But it also contained a large
number of consdentized political and union activists who carried ulterior agendas with them into the dub
rooms.
Elcott Rhoxa was one such activist. He was once a player and later served as an official for
Swallows. After obtaining his BA degree from the: University of Fort Hare, he went to work at
Volkswagen, where he became a member of the inner cirde of union activists around Albert Gomomo -
who was himself an official of Swallows - building representative shop floor structures for Africans and
seeking unity with NUMARWOSA. When the union insurgents took over Volkswagen's Liaison
Committee in the early 1970s, Rhoxa was elected <is the Committee's secretary.
Rhoxa began his career as a sports activist while at Fort Hare playing in the SARU-affiliated
South Eastern District Rugby Union, where he was recruited to the cause of non-racial sport by the
Union's vice-president, a staunch member of the Fan Africanist Congress. Rhoxa's adherence to non-
racial sport grew out of a principle:
We should integrate so that...a player can be judged according to his merit. We don't
want to see people playing according to their racial grouping....So we felt we should have
one board where everybody's talent or performance can be measured, because we
cannot know if I am a star in an African Board and this one is a star in a coloured
Board, and you are a star in a white Board, then we will not know actually who is a star
in South Africa. What we wanted was that South Africa be represented by all people
who live in it.
His concluding line not only echoes the Freedom Charter, but also expresses an elemental concept of
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justice and equality that individuals should be allowed to succeed or fail on their own merit.
But the cause of non-racial sport was promoted for both principled and instrumental reasons.
According to Rhoxa, the attack on racial sporting structures simultaneously promoted the pursuit of
broader goals extending well beyond the touch-lines on the rugby field:
I felt that it is important now to politicize our members and the community through
rugby, and then rugby now will be used as a platform to express our political aspiration.
Rugby should not be played for mere pleasure. We should now use rugby as a weapon
to break the racial attitude of the South African government. We felt that we should
use it as a platform to conscientize our members. Because after we have joined the
non-racial sport we started talking about the non-racial policy, how important, how
advantageous it will be to us. And then the principles and policy of the African
National Congress now also came into meetings, where it was also incorporated in the
whole thing.
Where open political organization was impossible in the vicious repression of the 1960s, sport presented
an opportunity for continued activity:
If we establish a political organization, it will be in jeopardy, because it's easy for the
government to ban it. But it will be very difficult for the government to ban sport, and
say people should not play sport. But now you must use sport as a channel through
which we can express our aspiration. What was important was that people should be
rallied in that [non-racial] direction, they should be reorganized and repolititized, so that
they should know how we should live in this country.
Rhoxa worked with a number of other activists. Ronnie Boyce was also a student at Fort Hare, and
along with other graduates from Lovedale and Healdtown, joined the efforts to bring Uitenhage's African
clubs over to the cause of non-racial sport. Boyce was one of the UAW's original complement of four
shop stewards at Volkswagen. There were also a number of graduates of Limekhaya High School in
Uitenhage and Newell High School in Port Elizabeth who joined their efforts, the latter spurred on by
their involvement in the South African Students' Organisation [SASO] and the Black Consciousness
Movement, both of which were extremely strong in Port Elizabeth. A younger generation of activists,
raised in the student movement of the 1970s thus found common cause in sport with older workers and
activists, such as Albert Gomomo and Scoma, who had direct experience of the 1950s and the repression
of the next decade.
Rhoxa tells the story of Newell alumni on Swallows who were pressured into non-racial sport as
a result of growing embarrassment at having to represent an all-African team in the official structures
while playing friendly matches against their former school-mates, now firmly in the KWARU fold. The
sports activists manipulated these sentiments to encourage especially the younger players - who usually
had direct or indirect experience of the student movements burgeoning around the country in the wake
of the Soweto uprising - to leave the SAARB. In addition to these more political motivations, the sports
activists generously folded into the mixture more pragmatic arguments calculated to appeal to the
player's ambitions: that by remaining in the racial structures they would never have the opportunity to
compete at an international level and that the splits which had occurred - and which would increase -
would rob them of effective competition as the best teams left for the non-racial fold.40 His story
provides an excellent example of how micromobilization contexts exert sometimes subtle moral suasion
on potential recruits to a movement: activists may use the recruit's desire to be well thought of by his
peers as a way of coaxing him into participation.
Swallows did break with the Uitenhage African Rugby Board, but instead of following the Star
of Hope Club into KWARU, the non-racial activists steered the club into the SARU-affiliated Uitenhage
and District Rugby Union, making Swallows the first African club to join coloured teams in the cause of
non-racial sport. Rhoxa was elected as the Swallows delegate to approach SARU for applications:
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So we decided to join the Uitenhage and District Rugby Union, which was then all
coloured, now to show the people that wo didn't join the SARU fold just because we
wanted to accommodate ourselves, but what made us join them is that we felt we have
adopted the principle of non-racialism.
The principle was not uniformly accepted, however. Some Swallows players and officials stayed behind in
the Uitenhage African Rugby Board, but even some of those who went over to Uitenhage and District
maintained their old consciousness.
The non-racial sport activists used various educational means to change these African
sportsmen's attitudes. The activists' would often sit down with younger players and "preach" non-
racialism:
Now, fresh chaps who have joined us, we are trying to show them that rugby is not
playing only for mere enjoyment. We have another cause, it is a matter of principle
now, and that they should not look on rugby just as a sport. Some of them still have
their racial attitude. When we play there [in the coloured areas] you see them shouting,
"Coloureds," and all that, they use the word, "hottentots," which is that word for
coloured. We try and tell them that, no, they should not speak in that manner now, and
that they should see coloureds irrespective of color as a brother, since we play under
non-racial sport.
These discussions would take place informally and casually, among the players and officials:
When we come to the meetings we are dealing only with the business, but outside when
we meet, we speak rugby. We also talk about the subject of non-racialism, how
important and how advantageous to us....We leave rugby practices, as we go home on
the bus, we are watching sport, and during off-season, when we meet we have parties,
we also talk about rugby.
In this way they hoped to consolidate the political project of building non-racial rugby in the town.
These discussions would include mostly Africans and some coloureds, both non-workers and
workers, and among the latter would be a considerable number of Volkswagen employees. In addition to
the activists, there were seven or eight Swallows players who were Volkswagen employees, as were the
club's President, Secretary, and Vice-Secretary. The activists' preaching thus fell on a broader network
of Volkswagen workers, who in turn could influence their co-workers.
But Rhoxa and the Swallows were not alone. Other activists in the UAW, such as Kenny
Tshaka, were also active in non-racial rugby politics; he later became a member of the UAW and then
NAAWU Executive Committees at Volkswagen, Ibut in rugby circles he was one of the non-racial
activists from Star of Hope who chose not to move to KWARU. Instead, he launched a new club, Lions,
which affiliated to Uitenhage and District. He played a formidable role conscientizing the mostly
younger players who joined his team in the politics of non-racialism.41
The efforts by African sports leaders to bring the most important clubs over to the non-racial
sports movement parallels and reinforces the efforts by workplace leaders to build a united body under
the auspices of NUMARWOSA. Im both cases, coloured activists had built organizations in the 1960s -
Uitenhage and Districts in the case of rugby and NUMARWOSA at the workplace - and had broken
free of racially restrictive national bodies - the South African Rugby Federation and the Trade Union
Council of South Africa - but had not succeeded in bridging the racial divide against which they were
founded.
In both cases, on a very local level Afriain activists were themselves developing an inclusive
policy of non-racialism which encouraged them to look for opportunities for broader unity. Indeed, the
search for sporting and workplace unity often involved the very same individuals. Albert Gomomo, a
crucial figure in the organization of workers at Volkswagen was simultaneously a major figure in the
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development of non-racial rugby. Gomomo happened to be working close to Chris "Papa" Williams, who
was simultaneously a key administrator in SARU rugby and the President of NUMARWOSA. Through
such personal and sometimes rather serendipitous processes activists from both sides in these two
spheres found each other. Thus the familiarity which preexisted in rugby smoothed the process through
which coloured and African activists organized on a non-racial basis in the workplace.
VI: WAR OF MANEUVER: THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1980 AND THE
CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION AT VOLKSWAGEN
Jurrie Harris and the rest of the NUMARWOSA-UAW negotiating team had only a vague idea what the
next few weeks would hold for them when they convened a general meeting of Volkswagen workers on
Sunday morning 15 June 1980 in Uitenhage's Jubilee Hall. The meeting was a report-back on the wage
talks then taking place in the IC in Port Elizabeth. The talks deadlocked on the first day after
NUMARWOSA-UAW demanded a "living wage" of R2.00 per hour, up from the prevailing minimum of
R1.15, while the companies offered only R1.30. When the local magistrate banned the report-back as
well as a hastily planned meeting later that day at a church in Kabah, the workers were incensed, and
decided then and there to stop work the next day to continue the report back, this time on company
premises.42
On 16 June workers showed up for work at the normal time, but gathered on the lawns in front
of Managing Director Peter Searle's office, to receive the aborted report-back. They directed their shop
stewards, Harris, Johnson, and Mpushe to negotiate directly with top management, fearing that if they
left the factory premises they would be locked out, lose their leverage over the company, and with it any
chance to bargain.
Instead of a meeting with management, the workers were addressed by the Labour Relations
manager, Ivan Broderick, who told them management would respond to their demands, but only if they
went back to work. His intervention was not, to say the least, well received. Scoma relates the events
which followed:
He promised Peter Searle that he knows Africans, so he will be able to speak to them.
Then Africans showed him that he did not know them. They let him come into the
group, then they surrounded him, they started to beat him.
Kwinana was also present at the meeting, and adds the following details:
He wanted to address the workers himself, that's where he got the beating. Workers
told him, "We are sick and tired of your tactics. You are not our leader. Our leaders
are the shop stewards, and...we give our undertaking to the shop stewards to meet Peter
Searle and top management, not you." We didn't recognize Broderick and the Labor
Relations Department en bloc. We didn't want our complaints channeled through them.
We want channels through our shop stewards and to the top management, because we
wanted a direct reply.
The workers forcibly rejected management's preferred mode of communication, and replaced it with
their own chosen form of negotiation. The company had recognized NUMARWOSA and later the
UAW in the hope of having a negotiating partner who could speak for the entire workforce. Now that
"partner" was speaking with a unified voice backed up by thousands of workers gathered together on the
company grounds. These spokesmen were not chosen at the spur of the moment, but had spent ten
years establishing structures in the factory and building their own credibility as the workers'
democratically elected leaders.
The shop stewards remained locked in discussion with management until the early afternoon,
and returned to the workers without a settlement, whereupon the workforce voted to strike. They
walked out the gates, and triumphantly marched through "white" Uitenhage following a number of
different paths back to then- respective townships. The largest contingent, made up almost exclusively of
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African workers, headed southwest back to Kwanobuhle, crossing a large cement bridge over the
Swartkops River, and passing a huge, foul-smelling sewerage plant before arriving home in the African
township. The other group - made up of both coloureds and Africans - headed northwest along Durban
Street and into the central business district, where they turned north towards Kabah and towards the
coloured townships stretching off towards the foot of the Groot Winterhoek mountains. At the fork
where Kamesh and Maduna Roads intersect, the workers separated, each to their own racially segregated
residential areas: Africans and some coloureds towards Kabah, the mass of the coloureds towards the
townships of Gerald Smith, Thomas Gamble, and Rosedale. The geography of the workers' march out
of the factory itself highlights the racial and residential divisions between workers which elsewhere have
undercut concerted worker action, but which Vollcswagen workers had been able to overcome.
Gcinuhlanga Gxowa participated in the walkout and march through town. "To me it was a new
experience," he said, "because I was used to the school strikes, and it was my first year at work." Student
strikes in 1977 had been violently suppressed by the SAP, but Gxowa was struck by the "system's"
different reaction to the Volkswagen workers.
Actually the police were just standing in the center of the town, when we were passing
and moving as that huge group of people from work, moving through the town. They
were standing. They couldn't do anything, because we were the strongest force that they
had ever seen in Uitenhage, and it was just orderly, so nobody was fearing anything.
Kwinana marched with some measure of pain and foreboding.
I know what happens, I know the aftermath of a breakdown, what follows, because I
know. I am the first one to be sacked, because they know they don't want me at the
factory, because I was convicted for ANC activity before.
Nonetheless he was jubilant.
We are commanding. We are commanding. The workers are commanding now. No
more the police or the Labour Relations Department.
A new era of industrial relations had begun.
The strike continued for another three weeks, during which time the workers met daily in the
car park in front of the plant. There they would gather to receive report backs from the negotiators, and
make collective decisions. In such a way workers could recreate the "collective worker" identity normally
imposed by the factory and its division of labor, but weakened once they walked out the gates. The
Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation, a civic body dominated by NUMARWOSA-UAW shop stewards,
provided an organizational focus in Ihe townships, holding meetings, distributing leaflets, and conducting
house visits. Furthermore, the informal networks among shop stewards and workers, as well as the ANC
cell system developed during the 1970s provided communication and support links between workers
which bolstered the strike. The strike was eventually settled through the intervention of an IMF
negotiator who held talks with Rademeyer to broker an agreement acceptable to both sides.43
The workers' return to Vollcswagen was us significant as their departure, because it was as
uneventful as the walkout had been dramatic. Once the union had agreed to the settlement, all the
strikers returned to work en masse, leaving no doubt that they were the true force representing the
workers. During the strike the company had tried many times to crack the workers' solidarity: the gates
remained open, and it offered to grant the wage increase to any worker who returned; VW even hired a
helicopter to drop leaflets in the townships promoting their offer. No more than fifty or sixty workers
responded. But once the union made its agreement, everyone returned.
The conclusion of the strike reaffirmed and validated the workers' initial motivations to act: they
had risked a great deal by striking, and had not only won important concessions, but emerged mtact with
no victimization by the company nor by the police. The lesson regarding the advantages of disciplined
collective action was evident for all.
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In the years following the strike, the newly-merged union, NAAWU, would use the its
resources - the strength and legitimacy of the shop steward system, informal networks, international
intervention, and most importantly, the solidarity between African and coloured workers - again and
again in a protracted "war of position" with management. In the immediate aftermath of the strike it was
the first workplace where the new unions won the right to full-time shop stewards, workers paid by the
company, who spent their entire working day involved in union affairs.44 By the mid-1980s NAAWU
had 5 full-time and 26 part-time shop stewards, giving the union an extremely deep base on the shop
floor. In building off of its initial success in 1980, it won further concessions regarding disciplinary and
retrenchment procedures and protection from supervisorial abuses which provided substantial benefits to
its members and expanded workers' control.
VI: CONCLUSION: SHOPFLOORS, RUGBY FIELDS, AND WORKER
SOLIDARITY
The structure of residential life in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth produced in Uitenhage many
opportunities for cross-race contact between Africans and coloureds, while producing a far more
thorough segregation in Port Elizabeth. The informal and formal networks described by the concept
micromobilization context were heavily shaped by these social patterns, and tended to reproduce them.
In Uitenhage these social networks tended to include Africans and coloureds, while in Port Elizabeth
they did not, and tended to remain bottled up in workers' racially defined communities. In short, the
micromobilization contexts - and the patterns of familiarity, trust, and affinity - crucial for building the
union in Uitenhage were defined as much by class as by race, while in Port Elizabeth, race was a far
more prominent factor.
Relationships between African and coloured union activists in the workplace were thus facilitated
by a range of prior contacts growing out of Uitenhage's racially mixed Kabah Location. These contacts
were most pronounced in the micromobilization context of rugby. Rugby brought ordinary workers
together in meaningful relationships which provided Africans and coloureds sustained involvement in
each others' social lives away from work. At the level of union leadership, coloured rugby players served
as intermediaries introducing African union activists to coloured shop stewards, softening their mutual
distrust. In these ways, coloureds and Africans at all levels of the workforce could face each other as
familiars rather than strangers; as acquaintances rather than with steely disregard for the alien "other;" as
people with a store of common experiences rather than merely antagonisms; people to be included in a
common organization around shared interests. The social experience of sport, as well as the broader
social linkages sketched above constituted a set of bridging experiences and networks between coloureds
and Africans, providing both the foundation and the means upon which a non-racial union could be built.
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